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MARKET STRUCTURE, ENTRY, AND PERFORMANCE 
IN KOREA 
Kap-Young Jeong and Robert T. Masson* 
Abstract-This paper applies a recursive model of structure- 
entry-performance with structural feedbacks to 62 Korean 
manufacturing industries for 1976-81. The results strongly 
support the market power hypothesis. The results also indi- 
cate that, despite active government intervention, the invisible 
hand is working: structure is evolving as expected with high 
profits leading to entry and consequently lower profits. How- 
ever, there is little support for limit pricing hypotheses in this 
explosively growing economy. 
I. Introduction 
W E test the structure -> conduct -- perfor- 
AV, Imance, with feedbacks, paradigm using 
Korean data. There has been little S -- C -- 
P -- S research for the "Newly Industrialized" 
Countries (NICs). (Exceptions include Chou 
(1988) and Lee (1986).)'NICs present different 
challenges and opportunities for testing. Korea's 
growth has been explosive. Its manufacturing sec- 
tor grew at a real rate of 20% over 1966-77, a 
900% increase. The government takes a strong 
hand, potentially speeding or subverting the invis- 
ible hand. Despite imports that make market 
boundaries hard to define uniquely, protection 
insulated Korea's domestic markets through the 
early 1980s. Domestic markets are unusually 
well-defined geographically, as it is only six hours 
by road to any market. 
Prior to the 1980s Korea was protectionist, it 
subsidized firm growth,' encouraged mergers and 
interfirm agreements. Its industrial policy was 
notable for its active intervention, strong export 
orientation, and bias towards "bigness." Given 
imperfections in capital markets, one goal was to 
create domestic profits to fund investments and 
export expansion. Profits could better be attained 
by large firms in concentrated domestic markets. 
The legacy is high concentration2 and predomi- 
nance of large "Jaebul": independent businesses 
affiliated through financial ties (including stock 
ownership). Market power may have been an 
engine of growth, this we do not test. What we do 
test is whether market power was indeed an 
outcome of high concentration in Korea. And 
now that Korea has changed its focus post take-off 
to a procompetitive stance,3 we can ask about the 
legacy of high concentration. 
Our model examines simultaneity between 
market structure and performance as do Martin 
(1979), Masson and Shaanan (1982, 1984, 1987), 
Geroski, Masson and Shaanan (1987) and Jeong 
(1985). The next section presents the model. Prior 
to presenting the profit equation we review latent 
variable tests for limit pricing (Masson and 
Shaanan, 1982). The results in section III support 
the market power hypothesis and (despite gov- 
ernment activism) an invisible hand hypothesis: 
Entry occurs where profits are high, and when 
entry occurs profits fall as expected in free mar- 
kets. There is, however, little support for limit 
pricing. 
II. The Model 
Profits in t - 1 attract entry in t, which deter- 
mines concentration at the beginning of t + 1. 
Profits through t + 1 are generated by initial 
concentration and entry. Factors affecting entry 
are entry barriers and growth. Profits are affected 
by these and trade. Behavioral interpretations 
are: (1) If concentration follows minimum effi- 
cient scale, market forces are pushing towards 
economic efficiency; (2) If concentration deter- 
mines profits, this suggests market power; (3) If 
measured barriers reduce entry, they are valid 
measures of barriers; (4) If barriers influence 
profits, there may be entry deterrence; (5) If (3) 
and (4) are related in a fashion to be discussed, 
this supports limit pricing; (6) If entry reduces 
profits this reflects the competitive nature of the 
entry process. 
Received for publication October 13, 1988. Revision ac- 
cepted for publication December 5, 1989. 
* Yonsei University and Cornell University, respectively. 
Woosik Chu and anonymous reviewers provided useful sug- 
gestions. 
1 Exporters were granted subsidized loans and importing 
licenses. 
2The Economist (Feb. 20, 1988) cites the unusually high 
concentration in markets and of ownership as Korea's unfa- 
vorable legacy of growth. 
3 In the 1980s Korea introduced antitrust, reduced its mar- 
ket power strategy and restricted intercorporate shareholdings 
and credit access. 
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Assuming linearity (we test for this) we present 
our model in table 1. There are three obvious 
sources of simultaneity: between profits and con- 
centration or entry, between advertising and 
profits, and between international trade and 
profits. We handle the first by treating the vari- 
ables affecting concentration, CR(t), as predeter- 
mined or exogenous, assuiling the concentra- 
tion-profits link is recursive through entry. A 
sufficient condition for recursive identification is 
that error covariances be zero. This was verified 
empirically.4 Advertising and profits are not re- 
cursive, we rejected the need to instrument with a 
Hausman test. We treat trade as if exogenous.5 
Without an explicit trade model we cannot test 
for identification so we test robustness by using 
alternative specifications. 
A. The Concentration Equation 
Concentration is defined as the share of the 
three largest firms measured at the beginning of 
t. This is determined by barriers, past growth, and 
entry. Concentration equations are normally 
called estimates of long-run concentration. The 
assumption that errors are distributed around 
long-run levels seems unlikely for Korea. Our 
equation reflects concentration at this stage of 
evolution, its error structure is used to test for 
recursive identification. 
Scale economies play a major role in explaining 
concentration in developed countries,6 for NIC's 
scale economies and their effects may differ. La- 
bor-intensive production may prevail due to low 
wages or newer (typically more capital intensive) 
technologies may prevail. Scale economies may 
be less important if an industry is in flux, growth 
is rapid (Stigler, 1939) or the government inter- 
venes. 
Minimum efficient scale (MES) is proxied by 
the Florence median: average plant size at the 
midpoint of industry output relative to the do- 
mestic market (dividing by VS (value of ship- 
ments), minus X (exports), plus M (imports)). To 
capture disadvantages of sub-optimal operation 
we use the Cost Disadvantage Ratio (Caves et al., 
1975). CDR is the ratio of the value added per 
worker in smaller plants to that for the remaining 
plants. MES is only a barrier if the CDR is small, 
so we use MESC MES(1 - CDR). 
To measure an Absolute Capital Cost barrier 
we use ACC = MES * (industry assets). Credit 
markets are less perfect in Korea so one might 
TABLE 1.-THE MODEL 
CR(t) = ao + ar1B + a2GRO(t - 1) + a3ENT(t - 1) + lr(t) (1) 
(+) (-) (-) 
ENT(t) = p0 + 31CR(t) + f2B + 13H(t - 1) + J4GRO(t - 1) + E(t) (2) 
1l(t) = Yo + Y1CR(t) + Y2B + Y3ENT(t) + Y4GRO(t) + Y5EXS(t) 
+ Y6IMS(t) + 7(t) (3) 
(?) 
Note: The variables are defined as: 
CR(t) industry 3 firm concentration in period t, 
B a vector of industry entry barriers in period t, 
ENT(r) = entry of new firms in period r, 
l(r) -industry profit rate in period T, 
GRO(r) -industry growth rate in period r, 
EXS(t) industry export-sales ratio in period t, 
IMS(t) industry import-sales ratio in period t, 
,u(t), e(t), 7j(t) )stochastic disturbance terms. 
Expected signs are in parentheses. 
Example correlations are Corr(g, E) = 0.016, Corr(e, 7) = 
-0.031, Corr(g,u,) = -0.054. 
5 The Hausman test in principle permits treating a variable 
like advertising as exogenous when exogenous product charac- 
teristics that determine advertising lead to wide variations 
relative to endogenous variations (steel versus automobiles). If 
exogenous factors lead some products to be imports (oil) and 
others exports (computers) and the exogenous variation is 
large relative to the endogenous variation then the treatment 
as if exogenous will be robust. 
6 For example, Martin (1979), Hart and Clarke (1980), Lyons 
(1980), Geroski, Masson and Shaanan (1987). 
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expect ACC to be important. For product dif- 
ferentiation we use the advertising-sales ratio 
(ASR). We assume all advertising can be at- 
tributed to domestic sales and use ASR A/(VS 
- X), where A is advertising.7 
Lagged growth and entry are included. Growth 
might attract entry and lower concentration, past 
entry should capture entry realizations above or 
below expectations. 
B. The Entry Equation 
Entry is defined by the rate of change in the 
number of firms ((nt - nt1)/nt_).8 It is as- 
sumed to be a function of concentration, barriers, 
past profits and growth. Other entry studies pre- 
sume the invisible hand determines entry (Orr, 
1974; Masson and Shaanan, 1982, 1984, 1987; 
Baldwin and Gorecki, 1987; Shapiro and 
Khemani, 1987). In Korea this is less clear, our 
entry equation can be used to see if entry occurs 
as if it were a freer market.9 
High concentration may lead to expectations of 
either cooperation or of retaliation post entry.10 
That barriers retard entry is tautological if they 
exist. Growth and profits, if they raise expectations 
for entrant profits, should attract entry. 
C. Latent Variable Testing for Limit Pricing 
The limit pricing test depends upon the "entry 
forestalling" condition, the zero entry profit level. 
The latent variable Hf is defined by solving 
(2) for ENT==O=-fl= O-(130/13)-(31/183) 
CR- (f2/f33)B - (,f4/13)GRO. 
The static model with an exogenous lag pre- 
dicts that a monopolist with low barriers would 
maximize short-run profit, Im because the pre- 
sent value of Hf forever is less than that for Hm 
followed by entry and lower profits. As barriers 
increase, at some point Bain's "ineffectively im- 
peded entry" case switches to limit pricing or 
"effectively impeded entry." Optimal profits fall 
to Hf(CR, B, GRO), with drHf/dB > 0. Very high 
barriers mean entry is "blockaded," flf() = Ha'. 
A monopolist's profits would be Htm for very high 
or low barriers, but lower for intermediate levels. 
The 1970s had dynamic models of Kamien and 
Schwartz (1971), Baron (1973) and Gaskins (1971). 
In these (expected) entry rates increase as price 
rises above ff, so "optimal profits," Ho, is gener- 
ally between Hf and Hm unless entry is block- 
aded (or the monopoly is "eliminating" fringe 
firms). For reasons similar to Bain's, at low barri- 
ers one may have dH'/dB < 0, but eventually 
H0' must rise to Htm. 
The 1980s seminal paper of Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982), established limit pricing as an 
equilibrium in an incomplete information game. 
Extensions by Matthews and Mirman (1983) and 
Saloner (1982) reveal that the actions of a limit 
pricing firm are similar to those in the 1970s 
models, Hfm 2 fl' 2 Hf 
Our test for limit pricing starts with the com- 
parative statics result: Hm 2 Hl' > HfI, and 
dH0/dB 2 0, and for large B, Ho = Htm. The 
power of the test comes from 0' being a func- 
tion of multiple barriers, B1, B2, . . ., as the ratios 
of their slopes between H0 and Hf must be 
identical for each. That is, if B--o + aiBi, 
and dH0/9dB = k(dHfd/B), this implies daH/adB 
= k(Hl/fdBi) for all i. The inter-equation ratios 
of slopes are all equal to k. 
We define the latent variable, Ho, by assuming 
that if concentration is 100 an industry can achieve 
HI0, but for lower concentration Ha < H0, where 
Ha- is "actual profits." In linear form we identify 
Hl0 by H= Ho + y(CR - 100). 
D. The Profit Equation 
Profits are measured as profits on assets 
(accounting profits plus interest on debt as a 
percentage of assets). HIa through the period is 
assumed to be a function of initial CR, barriers, 
entry, growth, export intensity and import inten- 
sity. It is illustrated as linear because linearity 
was not rejected empirically. 
Concentration, barriers, and entry reflect do- 
mestic competition. Concentration reflects mar- 
ket power, whether or not it stems from coop- 
7Most Korean exports were advertised by importers. 
'More recent work shows that this measure of entry is not 
dominated by "turnover," as in more mature economies, and 
that it captures the effects of changes in competition (Jeong 
and Masson, 1990). 
9 There were few limit observations, so Tobit modelling was 
not called for. 
10 High concentration and price may also signal high entrant 
profits if collusion is easy, or low profits if collusion is fragile 
and entry is destabilizing. Empirically there are opposite 
signed results for Canada and the United States. Other hy- 
potheses and results are discussed in Masson and Shaanan 
(1987). 
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eration.11 Entry may reduce profits by reducing 
concentration, reducing incumbents' residual de- 
mand or destabilizing industry "agreement." 
Growth can raise or lower Ha and/or HI 
(Masson and Shaanan, 1982). High growth may 
lead to "demand pull" profits or raise Hl if it 
makes the opportunity cost of deterring entry too 
great. Alternatively, if significant entry deterrence 
remains optimal and growth attracts entry, then 
HI may fall. Expected growth also may lead to 
lower current profits in learning models. There is 
no a priori sign expectation, although many em- 
pirical studies support a positive relationship. 
Next we have import and export intensity, de- 
fined as IMS = M/(VS - X + M) and EXS = 
X/(VS - X + M). These too have ambiguous ex- 
pected signs. High prices may attract imports, or 
high imports may lead to low prices. Domestic 
market power may correlate with greater exports 
if marginal costs are rising (cf. White (1974)). 
International price discrimination may lead to a 
negative sign because HL0 weights both domestic 
and foreign sales. If high profits are earned on 
domestic sales and export markets are more com- 
petitive, total profit enhancing exports may lower 
measured profit rates. Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974) 
and Pugel (1978) find positive relationships be- 
tween exports and profits in the United States 
and United Kingdom, but Pugel (1980) and 
Jacquemin, de Ghellinck, and Huveneers (1980) 
find little support for this. 
A Hausman test for endogeneity would require 
modeling the trade sector. This is beyond our 
scope. We instead tested robustness of the other 
coefficients to alternative trade specifications. 
These included exclusion of the trade variables, 
adding instead a measure of effective tariffs 
and/or using trade-adjusted concentration and 
MES variables.12 The results were robust (availa- 
ble upon request). 
III. Empirical Results 
The sample contains 62 Korean Standard In- 
dustrial Classification industries, selected subjec- 
tively as "well-defined" industries by examination 
of their product lines (see appendix). 
A. Concentration 
In table 2, equation 1 is aggregated, equations 
2 and 3 are for consumer and producer goods, 
respectively (a Chow test, F = 3.283, rejects ag- 
gregation). Barriers are positive and significant, 
excepting significance of ASR in consumer 
goods.13 Entry is negative and significant, but 
only marginally for producer goods. 
Growth is positively related to concentration, 
and significant excepting producer goods. For de- 
veloped countries growth has been negatively as- 
sociated with concentration. The finding for Ko- 
rea may reflect: (1) Learning-by-doing may lead 
firms to expand shares in growing markets; (2) 
Successful firms may trigger "take-off' leading to 
high firm shares and high growth (Demsetz, 1973); 
(3) New markets may have fewer firms, and 
greater growth rates; (4) The government may 
consolidate firms in key growth markets. 
The results generally appear like those in free 
market economies. MESC is important in deter- 
mining CR, as it should be if the invisible hand 
were at work. If each firm had one minimum 
efficient scale [MES] plant, concentration would 
TABLE 2.-ESTIMATION OF CONCENTRATION RATIOS 
(1) (2) (3) 
Independent All Consumer Producer 
Variables Industries Goods Goods 
Constant 40.974a 37.495a 43.135a 
(10.366) (6.998) (6.913) 
MESc 1.429a 1.634a 1.274a 
(5.086) (4.677) (2.448) 
ACC 0.298a 0.633b 0.277a 
(2.788) (1.534) (1.761) 
ASR 3.449a 2.055 10.039a 
(2.087) (1.031) (1.756) 
GRO(t - 1) 0.168a 0.212a 0.116 
(2.306) (2.238) (0.872) 
ENT(t - 1) -0.128a -0.115a -0.162b 
(-2.165) (-1.587) (-1.450) 
R2 0.603 0.663 0.511 
F 19.496 13.233 7.051 
N 62 32 30 
Notes: t-ratios are given in parentheses. 
a Significant at the 5% level (one-tailed test). 
bSignificant at the 10% level (one-tailed test). 
Given the above, if Ho ? 0 + J31B + 132CR, 1a 
(,80 - lOOy) + f31B + (I02 + y)CR. Decomposing the coef- 
ficient on CR in 1la, the 182 reflects the influence of power 
through entry deterring (or attracting) effects and the y the 
ability to exercise power. 
12 Trade adjustments decrease CR by an average of 6.8 
percentage points for the total sample, 9.6 points for producer 
goods and 4.1 points for consumer goods. 
13 Using CR adjusted for trade we find ASR significant for 
consumer goods. 
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be CR = 3* MES, the top three Korean firms 
appear to be somewhat over double minimal opti- 
mal size predicted by the MES proxy.14 
B. Entry 
The entry equation is equation 1 in table 3. 
Pooling of producer and consumer-goods was not 
rejected (Chow test F = 0.184) and multi- 
collinearity was not a problem15 
A precondition for limit pricing is that entry 
respond to profits. Lagged profit, fla, is signifi- 
cant at the 10% level. The next question is 
whether the barriers proxies are valid. All three 
proxies have the expected sign, although ACC is 
insignificant. They -are not rejected as measures 
of barriers.16 
CR is positive and significant. In Canadian 
studies CR is negative and significant whereas in 
the United States it is positive and marginally 
significant.17 Masson and Shaanan (1987) discuss 
these findings and the theories associated with 
either sign (signals of expected "cartel instability" 
or "retaliation" for negative, signals of expected 
"cartel stability" or "accommodation" for posi- 
tive). In Korea this may additionally reflect pol- 
icy. In take-off the government encouraged entry 
to new, and hence concentrated markets. Testing 
whether this is a result of policy is beyond our 
scope. 
C. Profits 
The results for profit rates on assets18 are in 
table 3. Profits may be non-linear in barriers, but 
linearity was not rejected. Equation 2 reports fla 
over one business cycle, 1976 to 1981. Pooling the 
TABLE 3.-ESTIMATION OF PROFIT AND ENTRY RATES 
Entry Profit Rates' 
(2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variables (1) Aggregated Expansion Contraction 
Const. -18.807 5.418 a 5.964a 4.167 a 
(- 0.912) (6.221) (7.355) (3.481) 
CR 0.592a 0.044a 0.034a 0.049a 
(2.120) (3.497) (2.248) (2.429) 
MESC -1.086b 0.070b 0.093a -0.051 
(-1.611) (1.490) (1.722) (-0.679) 
ACC -1.101 -0.036a - 0.031a - 0.008b 
(-0.460) (-3.941) (-3.319) (-1.218) 
ASR - 6.516a 0.654a 0.532a 0.834a 
(- 1.802) (3.487) (2.415) (3.286) 
GRO 0.086 0.055a 0.039a 0.061a 
(0.332) (3.361) (3.244) (3.470) 
ENT n.a. -0.014a -0.009b -0.009 
(-2.536) (-1.418) (-1.113) 
EXS n.a. - 0.021a - 0.022b - 0.006 
(-1.953) (-1.530) (-0.378) 
IMS n.a. -0.034a -0.022a -0.013 
(-2.527) (-1.674) (-0.906) 
HIa 1.759b n.a. n.a. n.a. 
(1.352) 
K2 0.165 0.677 0.563 0.453 
F 2.806 16.908 12.242 8.672 
N 62 62 62 62 
Notes: n.a. not applicable. t-ratios are given in parentheses. 
a Significant at the 5% level (one-tailed test). 
bSignificant at the 10% level (one-tailed test). 
c Weighted least squares, weighing by the root of the value of shipments. 
14 We employed a Belsley-Kuh-Welsh (1980) test for multi- 
collinearity. The largest condition index was 8.504, where 
"problems" usually start for values above 20 or 30. 
15 Despite corr(MESC, CR) = 0.66, the highest condition in- 
dex was 11.998. 
16 In Masson and Shaanan (1987) ACC is dropped in a 
study using Canadian data because of a perverse sign in the 
entty equation. 
17 The Canadian and Korean studies both use the net num- 
ber of entrants as the dependent variable (the U.S. study uses 
shares). 
18 Similar results were obtained for PCM and similar but 
weaker results for profits on equity (Jeong, 1985). 
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cycle can be rejected (Chow test F = 3.772): we 
disaggregated expansion in equation 3, contrac- 
tion in 4. We do not report disaggregate producer 
and consumer goods estimates (the highest Chow 
test F = 1.462). 
The coefficient on CR is significant in every 
model:19 market power plays a significant role in 
profitability.20 Entry, which was positively corre- 
lated with lagged profits, now is shown to depress 
current profits, the effect is significant only for 
the full cycle and expansion results.21 These re- 
sults suggest that structure creates power, but 
that this eventually leads to entry, a structural 
feedback that reduces power in the long run. 
The results on the barrier measures are mixed. 
ASR is consistently positive and significant, but 
ACC is negative and generally significant.22 The 
sign of MESC is positive and significant during 
expansion and negative in the contraction.23 The 
trade variables are both negative, and insignifi- 
cant for the contraction. 
The negative sign on ACC led to specification 
tests. There was no multicollinearity problem24 
and ACC remains negative and significant after 
excluding CR and MES. There was evidence of 
tail dependence: five Heavy Industry and Chemi- 
cal (HIC) sector industries had large ACCs and 
low flaS.25 Deleting these, ACC remains nega- 
tive, albeit insignificant.26 
With no limit pricing it is possible that high 
capital costs could reduce profits on assets.27 
Clearly, little support is found for limit pricing. 
Comparative statics of limit pricing permit either 
sign in Hl?, but the ratio of each barrier's slope in 
I-P to that in If must be constant. By construc- 
tion, this means a constant ratio with those in 
ENT, and a consistent sign in H0 and hence in 
Hla. The mixed sign results observed here are not 
consistent with limit pricing. 
Limit pricing is not always optimal. It may not 
work in some environments and it may be too 
costly in others. As a check, we calculated our 
two latent variables at industry means. We found 
IHl = 15.6% and If = 4.9% and mean Ha = 9.8. 
Given our measure of profit rates, zero economic 
profits are reached when Ha = p, where p 
(opportunity cost of capital).28 This suggests that 
entry forestalling in the mean industry would 
require negative economic profits: Limit pricing 
appears to be too costly to pursue.29 
IV. Conclusions 
Due to imperfect capital markets, Korean pol- 
icy in the 1970s was in part designed to create 
domestic profits to fund investment. They encour- 
aged large scale operations, generating concen- 
tration and market power. The resulting profits 
could be used for investment. We do not test if 
power aided growth, but do demonstrate that 
high concentration did lead to high profits. In our 
model of structural feedback we find that market 
concentration evolved as if facing the invisible 
19 One-tailed tests are footnoted, but CR is significant in 
two-tailed tests as well. In specifications with trade adjust- 
ments this result was robust, the significance on CR dropping 
to the 10% level in only one expansion specification. 
20 These results differ from Lee (1986). He found concentra- 
tion and economies of scale insignificant in explaining 1970 
profitability (on total capital) for 51 Korean industries. The 
time period was in early "take-off" for Korea, and his scale 
variable was measured using Japanese data as a proxy. 
21 Recent data have been made available that show that the 
entrants in the expansion had shares averaging 4% at the end 
of the upswing and 16% by the end of the downswing. The 
effects of entry on profits probably have some lag that is not 
modeled here. 
22Note the tables footnote one-tailed levels. As ACC has 
the "wrong" sign, a two-tailed test is appropriate, leaving 
contraction significance at 20%. 
23 Low barriers may influence profits through the entry 
variable: given any initial concentration and profit rate. The 
entry equation suggests more rapid entry with lower barriers 
and the profit equation suggests that entry depresses profits. 
The limit pricing test predicts a consistent effect of barriers, 
ceteris paribus. 
24 The highest condition index was 12.345. 
25 The average ACC for these five industries is 94.74 billion 
Won, while the mean for the entire sample is 14.44 billion 
Won. The average profit rate for these five industries is 
6.84%, while the mean is 9.80%. 
26PCM and return on equity results were similar. Coeffi- 
cients on other variables were not sensitive to excluding ACC, 
although significance of MES rose. 
27 An alternative is that incentives to expand HIC's may 
have led to over expansion. To test this we modeled policy 
intervention using a measure of subsidized loans. This was 
insignificant and did not switch the sign on ACC (even 
making it significant for the contraction-available upon re- 
quest). 
28Accounting profits are [I = R - M - W - rD, where R 
revenues, M materials costs, W- wage bill, D debt 
and r is interest rate. Economic profits are = R - M - W 
- rD - peE, where E equity and pe opportunity cost of 
equity. Since assets are equal to D + E, if pe = r = p, we can 
write zero economic profit as ((R - M - W)/(D + E)) = p, 
where the left side of this expression is accounting profits plus 
interest on debt. 
29 Despite subsidized credit, most firms in Korea were gen- 
erally resorting to non-subsidized credit at the margin. The 
real interest rates in Korea tended to be relatively high, so 
current earnings would have a large present value weighting. 
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hand. Entry responded to high profits, profits 
were eroded in the entry process. Higher concen- 
tration emerged where economies of scale, capi- 
tal requirements and product differentiation were 
greater. There is no support for "limit pricing" in 
these Korean data. The opportunity cost of deter- 
ring entry appears to be prohibitive in Korea, so 
limit pricing appears to be non-economic. 
In 1981 Korea started to reverse its pro-market 
power policy, passing its first antitrust law. The 
previous policy may have aided take-off, but 
power seems less desirable as the economy has 
matured. Our evidence supports the popular in- 
terpretation-the legacy of the earlier policy is 
continuing high domestic market power. 
DATA APPENDIX 
The data are for 62 Korean manufacturing industries of 
which 32 are consumer goods. Sample selection was deter- 
mined by the principle that KSIC industry classifications re- 
flect microeconomic markets. We subjectively excluded too 
broadly, narrowly, or vaguely defined industries. Our sample 
includes 48 four-digit and 14 five-digit SIC industries. Al- 
though five-digit SIC industries are on average more narrowly 
defined, they tend to be closer to our view of markets. Where 
data were available we used five-digit data. We excluded many 
over-inclusive four digit industries. The mean concentration 
of our five-digit industries was 52%O, and the overall sample 
mean was 58%. 
Concentration data were provided by the Korea Develop- 
ment Institute and the Economic Planning Board, Report on 
Mining and Manufacturing Survey. For a few four-digit indus- 
tries, concentration ratios were approximated by use of ship- 
ments-weighted averages of five-digit components. If the com- 
ponents were far different in concentration, the observation 
was dropped. CR for each industry is reported in Jeong 
(1985). 
Exports and imports come from the Korean Department of 
Customs Administration, Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade, 
1978. We reclassified the trade data according to KSIC indus- 
try definitions. 
MES is derived from the KSIC manufacturing census for 
each year and then averaged for 1976-80. ENT is also from 
the manufacturing census, ENT(t - 1) is the net change in 
the number of firms for 1975-1977, while ENT(t) is for 
1977-1981. 
All other variables use the above, augmented by data from 
the Bank of Korea, Financial Statement Analysis and the 
Korea Development Bank, Financial Analysis. Ila(t) is de- 
fined for the study period and fla(t - 1) is for 1974-1976. 
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